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Abstract: Information disclosure by firms has grown considerably. The increased level of firms’ 
disclosure has been accompanied by the loss of relevance of accounting information over time (Lev, 1989, 
Ramech and Thiagarajan, 1995, Lev and Zarowin, 1999, Brown and al, 1999, Chang, 1999 and Chalmers 
and al, 2011). Our objective is to determine whether the voluntary disclosure explains the low relevance 
of accounting information. We find that medium-technology companies have the highest level of 
relevance of accounting information. However, the relevance of the accounting model is low for low-
technology firms and high technology firms. The introduction of the overall disclosure index and sub-
indexes of disclosure has an effect on the relevance of the accounting model (this effect is significant only 
in some cases for low-tech firms). Furthermore, the addition of variables of disclosure to the accounting 
model makes the accounting variables relevant to investors for low-tech firms. For medium-tech firms, 
book values and earnings are relevant. While, for high technology firms, only the earnings are relevant. 
We also show that the introduction of intangible expenses, the weight of intangibles and the index of 
disclosure on intangibles is growing, but not significantly the relevance of the accounting model. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Information disclosure by firms has grown considerably. Indeed, firms disclose more and more non-
financial information through formal or informal means. The increased level of firms’ disclosure has been 
accompanied by a loss of accounting information’s relevance over time. The latter finding was 
demonstrated by Lev and Zarowin (1999), Brown and al (1999), Chang (1999), Soussi, Matoussi and 
Mouelhi (2006) and Chalmers and al (2011). Collins and al. (1997) find that the loss of accounting 
information’s relevance is explained by intangible investments, the frequency of non-recurring items and 
frequency of losses. Lev and Zarowin (1999) showed that losses and nonrecurring items are not causes, 
but these are symptoms of the decrease of accounting information’s relevance. Soussi, Matoussi and 
Mouelhi (2006) show that intangible investments and losses explain partly the low relevance of 
accounting information. Amir and Lev (1996) show that accounting information is relevant only when 
used in conjunction with non-financial information. Thus, growth in the level of voluntary disclosure is a 
main factor explaining the decline of accounting information’s relevance (Lundohlm et al, 2000). Our 
research is part of current research to explain the low level of relevance of accounting information. Our 
objective is to determine whether the voluntary disclosure explains the low relevance of accounting 
information. In the first part, we investigate whether the level of disclosure (measured by the overall 
disclosure) explains this decline of relevance. In the second part, we check if the disclosure level 
operationalized by the disclosure on intangibles explains this low relevance. We use sub-indexes of 
disclosure for each category of information and we study the effect of each of these sub-indexes on the 
relevance of accounting information to determine the categories of information that lead to low relevance 
of accounting information. We study the Canadian market because the Canadian standards are quite 
similar to IFRS standards that are currently the most encouraged1 and the Canadian model is 
representative of the Anglo American market model in which there is a significant pressure to 
communicate information to investors because corporate financing is done mostly through the capital 
market.2 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
                                                 
1According to a document published by the Canadian Accounting Standards Board entitled "Comparison of Canadian GAAP with IFRS," based on standards 
published in March 31, 2005. 
2Ding, and al 2004. 
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Amir and Lev (1996) show that earnings and book values are significantly associated with prices and 
returns when used in conjunction with non-financial information. Therefore, the non-financial 
information reduces the relevance of accounting information. Lee and al (2005) attribute the low 
correlation between stock returns and earnings mainly to noise resulting from the uncertainty. They add 
that to reduce the uncertainty associated with future earnings, the high-tech firms could provide 
investors with additional information. Lundholm et al (2002) show that the stock returns of firms better 
reflect future earnings when their level of voluntary disclosure increases and so the voluntary disclosure 
decreases the relevance of accounting information (same result found by Luo and al, 2006). Dontoh et al 
(2004) show that the decline of the association between security prices and accounting information is 
caused by the increase of non- information based negotiations. In Brazil, Lopes (2003) show that 
accounting numbers are more relevant for high-tech firms than for traditional firms. He explains his 
results by the fact that in the emerging market that he studied, the sources of information are less 
available than in developed markets. Unlike the above-mentioned articles, Healy et al (1999) find that 
firms with increasing levels of disclosure have also increasing relevance of current earnings. Lundohlm et 
al. (2000) have explained the contradiction with their results by the fact that since Healy and al (1999) 
did not use future earnings in the regression, the coefficients of current earnings necessarily capture the 
change in forecast future earnings. Also, Zhao (2002) shows that the level of disclosure about research 
and development has a significant effect on the relevance of accounting information. Furthermore, Gelb 
and Zarowin (2002) find that firms with high rates of disclosure have a higher degree of association 
between stock prices on the one hand and current earnings and future earnings on the other hand, 
relative to firms with low rates of disclosure. The results obtained by Lapointe-Antunes et al (2006) show 
that Swiss firms use discretionary accruals to smooth earnings. But this phenomenon is reduced for firms 
that voluntarily disclose more information in their annual reports or applying IFRS or GAAP. However, 
Banghøj and Plenborg (2008) find that a higher level of voluntary disclosure does not improve the 
association between current returns and future earnings. They ask the question: does the voluntary 
disclosure contains relevant information on future earnings or is that investors are unable to incorporate 
the voluntary information in the estimates of the firms’ values? 
 
3. Methodology 
 
According to our literature review, we propose to test the following hypotheses: 
* Hypothesis 1: The firm’s level of disclosure affects the relevance of the accounting model for evaluating 
companies 
* Hypothesis 2: The level of disclosure affects the relevance of accounting numbers of firms. 
 
Sample and Data Collection: We study a random sample of Canadian firms from the database found at 
www. SEDAR.com. We exclude firms in the banking and insurance sector to avoid the heterogeneity of 
accounting practices. Data is collected from annual reports for 2006 and 2007 (54 firms). We use www. 
finance.yahoo.com to collect information on market prices of corporate stocks. The analysis is performed 
on the total sample, then by breaking the sample into three subsamples: low-technology companies, 
medium-tech companies and high-tech companies. 
 
Specification of models: We estimate regression models in which the market value of the company is 
the dependent variable and earnings and the book value of equity are independent variables (Ohlson, 
1995, Collins and al, 1997, Barth and al, 1998). According to Brown and al (1999), researches 
operationalize relevance by the R ² of the regressions of stock prices on earnings per share and book 
value of equity per share. Inter-temporal differences and cross-sample differences of R ² are used as 
indicators that the relevance of accounting information has changed over time or that the relevance 
differs across disclosure regimes. Brown and al. (1999) estimate that the price model based on earnings 
and book value used by Collins and al (1997) and other researches, does not take into account the scale 
effect. Therefore, these variables must be adjusted by the price beginning of year as recommended by 
Christie (1987), Brown and al (1999) and Lo (2004). Lev and Zarowin (1999) consider a level of 61.8% of 
R2 for the model of the price based on book values and earnings as low level of R2. 
 
-Dependent Variable: Market value of the firm: it is the stock value 3 months after the end of the fiscal 
year (Collins and al, 1997, Ohlson, 1995).  
 
-Independent Variables: Book value of equity of the firm: it is the value of equity that are the property 
of shareholders (Allen, 2003). Using the number of shares = average number of shares outstanding, we 
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have: Book value of the company = (total assets at the end of the fiscal year - total liabilities at the end of 
the fiscal year) / weighted average number of shares outstanding. 
Net income before extraordinary items: Lev and Sougiannis (1996) used earnings before 
extraordinary items (also Lev and Zarowin, 1999). 
 
Level of Disclosure: Botosan (1997) uses the annual report as the base of his disclosure index because 
the annual report is generally considered one of the most important information about firms. 
Furthermore, the level of disclosure in annual reports is positively correlated with the level of 
information provided by other information mediums (Lang and Lundholm, 1993). Trabelsi and Labelle 
(2006) classify the content of financial reporting in seven categories of voluntary disclosure (see 
Appendix 4) useful to investors, financial analysts and standard setters. We use the same index of 
disclosure of Trabelsi and Labelle (2006) who study Canadian firms. Al-Shammari and Al-Sultan (2010) 
calculate the index of voluntary disclosure as the ratio of total items actually disclosed divided by the 
maximum possible score of items. Following this research, we use this method. 
 
-Control variables: They are: Size (Log TA), growth rate (GR), financial profitability (FP) and Leverage 
(Lev).The market value is positively associated with firm size, growth rate, financial profitability and 
Leverage (Cazavan-Jeny, 2004). 
Holthausen and Watts (2001) and Aboody and Lev (1998) show that managers, at the capitalization of 
certain intangibles, skew the amounts recognized for contractual reasons such that contract terms on the 
debt. 
 
Multiple regressions: In our research we estimate the models that are detailed in the following: 
 
Model 1: Basic model 
Pi,t       = α0+  α1  Ei,t    + α2   BVi,t  +  εi,t (1)  
Pi,t-1                                     Pi,t-1                Pi,t-1 
εi, t = residue. 
i: i company. 
t: year (t = 1 for 2006, t = 2 for 2007). 
P = Share price of the company three months after the end of the fiscal year. 
BV = compagny’s book value of equity at the end of the fiscal year divided by the number of shares. 
E = net income before extraordinary items per share of the company. 
 
Model 2 : Basic model with the introduction of control variables  
Pi,t = a0 + a1Ei,t + a2  BVi,t + a 3 Log TAi,t + a4 GRi,t + a 5 FPi,t + a 6 Lev i,t + εi,t .    
Pi,t-1                      Pi,t-1           Pi,t-1                                                                                                     
Log TA   = Log of total assets (Log base 10). 
GR = growth rate = variation in turnover between t and t-1 
FP           = financial profitability or return=net income /equity. 
Lev          = Leverage=long-term debt/equity. 
 
Model 3 : Basic Model with the introduction of control variables and index of global disclosure  
Pi,t  = b0 +  b1 Ei,t   + b2 BVi,t  + b 3Dgi,t+ b 4LogTAi,t+ b5GRi,t+ b 6FPi,t+ b 7Lev i,t+ εi,t .    
Pi,t-1                         Pi,t-1              Pi,t-1                                                                                                     
Dgi,t= Index of overall disclosure 
 
Model 4 : Basic Model with the introduction of control variables and D1  
Pi,t  = b0 +  b1 Ei,t   + b2 BVi,t  + b 3D1i,t+ b 4LogTAi,t+ b5GRi,t+ b 6FPi,t+ b 7Lev i,t+ εi,t .    
Pi,t-1                         Pi,t-1               Pi,t-1                                                                                                     
 
We replace D1 by D2, D3, D4, D5, D6 and D7and we study each model obtained. 
D1: index of background information disclosure, D2: index of disclosure of summary of past results, D3: 
index of disclosure of non- financial key statistics, D4:disclosure index of forecast information, D5: index 
of disclosure of discussion and analysis of management, D6: Index of disclosure on intangible assets, D7: 
index of disclosure of social and environmental information. 
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Classification by sector: We test the stability of models between the three sub-samples3 through the 
Chow test. We use STATA which is suitable for the treatment of panel data. 
4. Results and Discussion of the first part 
 
Table 1: Results for basic model (model 1) and basic model with introduction of  control variables 
Model Basic model 
Group 
variable           
Total 
Sample 
Low  
technology 
Medium 
technology 
High 
technology 
Total 
sample 
Low  
technology 
Medium  
technology 
High 
Technology 
BVi,t/Pi,t-1    0.883 
(45.38)*** 
0.498 
(1.72) 
0.873 
(39.37)*** 
-0.205    
(-0.39) 
0.826 
(43.32)*** 
 0.814 
(38.35)***   
-0.229 
(-0.44) 
Ei,t/Pi,t-1    -1.725 
(-7.09)*** 
1.549 
(0.99) 
-1.904 
(-6.78)***   
3.201 
(3.14)*** 
-2.551 
(-10.39)*** 
 -2.747 
(-9.90)***  
6.191 
(2.87)*** 
Log TA     -0.299 
(-4.76)*** 
 -0.303 
(-2.50)** 
-0.224 
(-1.32 )  
Lev     0.306 
(1.18   ) 
 0.417 
(1.30 )  
-0.179 
(-0.16 ) 
FP     
 
0.325 
(5.29 )*** 
 0.321 
(4.66 )***  
-0.902 
(-1.80 )*  
GR 
 
 
Test of 
homogeneity 
of 
constants 
 
Hausman 
test 
 
 
 
F = 1.45                         
P = 0.1053 
     > 5% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
F = 1.42                
P =  0.3157 
     > 5% 
 
 
 
F = 1.44               
P =  0.2047 
     > 5% 
 
 
 
F =   0.95               
P =  0.5514 
     >5% 
4.17E-09    
(2.22 )** 
 
F =  1.07                
P =  0.4147 
     > 5% 
 
 
 
F =  6.50                
P = 0.0431  
     < 5% 
 
 
CHI2= 
-38.98    
CHI2<0 
5.16E-09    
(2.17 )**  
 
F = 2.06               
P = 0.0693 
     > 5% 
7.51E-08    
(0.49 )  
 
F = 1.57                
P =  0.2791 
     > 5% 
 
 
R²  and  
number 
of 
observations 
R² = 
0.9920 
F = 
5981.36 
P  = 0.0000 
n= 99 
R² = 0.1742 
F= 1.90 
P = 0.1786 
n= 21 
R² = 0.9954 
F = 4785.29 
P = 0.0000 
N = 47 
R² =  
0.2609 
F =  4.94 
P = 0.0145 
n= 31 
R² = 
0.9948 
F = 
2915.21 
P = 0.0000 
n= 99 
 R² = 0.9973 
F = 2464.68 
P = 0.0000 
n = 47 
R² = 0.3852 
F =   2.51 
P = 0.0502 
n= 31 
 
Legend of Tables 1, 2 and 3: 
Low technology: LT : low technology sector 
Medium technology: MT : medium technology sector.  
High technology: HT : high technology sector.  
Pi, t=Share price of the company three months after the end of the fiscal year. 
BV=book value of equity of the  company at the end of the fiscal year divided by the number of shares. 
E=net income before extraordinary items per share of the company 
LogTA= Log of total assets (log base 10). 
GR= Growth rate = change in sales from t to t-1. 
FP=financial profitability or financial return=net income /equity. 
Lev=Leverage=long-term debt/equity. 
D1: index of disclosure of general information. 
D2: index of disclosure of summary of historical results. 
D3: index of disclosure of key non – financial statistics. 
D4: index of disclosure of forecast information. 
D5: index of disclosure in the Management report. 
D6: index of disclosure on intangibles 
D7: index of disclosure of social and environmental information 
F=value of the Fisher statistic. 
P: probability of F(or χ2)greater than the calculated critical value of F(χ 2)or significance of F(or χ2). 
OLS: ordinary least squares 
FE: fixed effects 
RE: random effects 
R²: model's explanatory power. 
n: number of observations. 
Values in parentheses are the values of t-statistics. 
*Significant at 10% 
                                                 
5 See appendix 2 
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**Significant at 5% 
***Significant at1% 
 
 
Table 2 : Results of multiples regressions (suite) 
Model Basic model with introduction 
 of control  variables and Dg 
 Basic model with introduction of 
control  variables and D1 
Basic model with introduction  
of control  variables and D2 
Basic model with introduction 
of control  variables and D3 
Group 
variable 
Total 
sample 
LT MT HT Total 
sample 
LT MT HT Total 
sample 
LT MT HT Total 
sample 
LT MT HT 
BVi,t/Pi,t-1    0.825 
(42.91)*** 
-0.357 
(-1.33) 
0.811 
(37.96)*** 
0.143   
(0.20) 
0.826 
(43.06)*** 
0.688 
(2.42)** 
0.813 
(38.11)*** 
0.111 
(0.19) 
0.825 
(43.59)*** 
0.759 
(2.75)** 
0.813 
(38.98)*** 
-0.364 
(-0.66 ) 
0.826 
(43.14)*** 
0.856 
(2.97)** 
0.813 
(38.13)*** 
-0.209 
(-0.39) 
Ei,t/Pi,t-1    -2.578 
(-
10.34)*** 
-19.739    
(-3.79)** 
-2.803 
(-9.95)***   
5.228 
(2.08   )** 
-2.556 
(-
10.34)*** 
5.746 
(1.49) 
-2.756 
(-9.88)***   
4.671 
(1.92)* 
-2.597 
(-
10.60)*** 
1.932 
(0.47) 
-2.780 
(-
10.16)*** 
6.50    
(2.95)*** 
-2.555 
(-
10.36)*** 
1.742 
(0.42) 
-2.752 
(-9.87)*** 
5.867 
(2.43)**  
Dg 0.816 
(0.69)   
11.784 
(2.16)   
2.167 
(1.08)   
-3.214 
(-0.77)    
            
D1     0.237 
(0.35)    
-2.567 
(-1.37)    
0.933 
(0.81)    
-2.498 
(-1.29)    
        
D2         0.772 
(1.62)   
1.462 
(1.78)*    
1.077 
(1.54)   
0.732 
(0.83)    
    
D3             0.646 
(0.54)    
10.293 
(1.81)*    
1.785 
(0.80)    
-0.762 
(-0.32)    
Log TA -0.286 
(-4.35)***    
-1.162 
(-1.33)    
-0.295 
(-2.44)**   
-0.200 
(-1.16)   
-0.292 
(-4.41)*** 
-0.102 
(-0.23) 
-0.293 
(-2.40)** 
-0.187 
(-1.11 )  
-0.312 
(-4.97)*** 
-0.661 
(-2.21)** 
-0.283 
(-2.36 )**  
-0.231 
(-1.36)   
-0.288 
(-4.35 )*** 
-0.487 
(-1.66 ) 
-0.296 
(-2.42)** 
-0.204 
(-1.12 ) 
Lev 0.251 
(0.92)    
2.721 
(3.00)*   
0.258 
(0.73)    
0.883 
(0.49)   
0.277 
(1.02 ) 
-0.861 
(-0.95) 
0.275 
(0.75 )  
0.924 
(0.65 ) 
0.212 
(0.81) 
0.071 
(0.11) 
0.325 
(1.01 ) 
-0.461 
(-0.38)  
0.286 
(1.09) 
-0.621 
(-0.85 ) 
0.380 
(1.16 ) 
0.177 
(0.11) 
FP 0.322 
(5.20)***    
29.231 
(4.99)**    
0.316 
(4.58)***   
-0.702 
( -1.23)     
0.322 
(5.17 )*** 
1.774 
(0.62 ) 
0.311 
(4.43) ***   
-0.629    
(-1.17)  
0.321 
(5.26 )*** 
1.629 
(0.64) 
0.310 
(4.55 )*** 
-0.946 
(-1.87 )* 
0.322 
(5.18 )*** 
0.744 
(0.32) 
0.317 
(4.56 )*** 
-0.805 
(-1.36 ) 
GR 4.22E-09    
(2.24)**    
4.28E-09    
(0.95)    
5.30E-09    
(2.23)**    
1.09E-07   
(0.67)   
4.14E-09    
(2.19 )** 
1.74E-09    
(0.40 ) 
5.02E-09    
(2.10 )**  
1.60E-07    
(0.97 )  
4.46E-09    
(2.39 )** 
2.08E-09    
(0.51 ) 
5.14E-09    
(2.21 )** 
4.51E-08    
(0.28 ) 
4.20E-09    
(2.23)** 
-6.62E-
10    
(-0.14 )  
5.26E-09    
(2.20 )** 
9.18E-
08    
(0.55) 
Test of 
homogeneity 
of 
constants 
F=  1.04               
P= 0.4569 
> 5% 
F= 12.77                
P= 0.0297 
< 5% 
F=   2.19                          
P= 0.0595 
> 5% 
F=   1.42                        
P= 0.3480 
>5% 
F= 1.06            
P=  0.4326 
> 5% 
F= 5.00                
P=  0.1060 
> 5% 
F= 1.90               
P= 0.1001 
> 5% 
F= 1.24                
P=  
0.4214 
> 5% 
F= 0.99               
P= 0.5134 
> 5% 
F= 4.06                
P= 
0.1379 
> 5% 
F= 1.81               
P=    
0.1170 
> 5% 
F=1.47                
P= 
0.3320 
> 5% 
F= 1.06               
P= 0.4258 
> 5% 
F= 4.00                
 P=  
0.1405 
> 5% 
F= 1.90                           
P= 0.0997 
> 5% 
F=    
1.34                                         
P= 
0.3788 
> 5% 
Hausman 
test 
 χ 2= 25.34 
P=  0.0003 
<0.05 
      
 
        
Estimation 
method 
retained 
OLS FE OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
R²  
and number 
of 
observations 
R²=0.9948 
F=2484.55 
P= 0.0000 
n= 99 
R²=0.0051                                         
F= 17.37 
P= 0.0196 
n= 21 
 
R²=0.9974
F=2121.20 
P= 0.0000 
n= 47 
R²=0.4005 
F= 2.19 
P= 0.0732 
n= 31 
R²=0.9948 
F=2474.97 
P= 0.0000 
n= 99 
R²=0.5257 
F=  2.06 
P= 0.1239 
n= 21 
R²=0.9973 
F=2094.19 
P= 0.0000 
n= 47 
R²0.4265 
F=   2.44 
P= 
0.0499 
n= 31 
R²=0.9949 
F=2543.50 
P= 0.0000 
n= 99 
R²=0.563 
F = 2.40 
P= 
0.0819 
n= 21 
R²=0.9975 
F= 
2184.58 
P= 0.0000 
n= 47 
R²=0.402 
F=  2.22 
P= 
0.0708 
n= 31 
R²=0.9948 
F=2479.55 
P= 0.0000 
n= 99 
R²=0.56 
F=  2.43 
P=  
0.0793 
n= 21 
R²=0.9973 
F=2093.54 
P = 0.0000 
n = 47 
R²=0.38 
F= 2.08 
P= 
0.0872 
n= 31 
 
The negative coefficient of earnings in some cases can be explained by the fact that, in an economic 
environment where there is frequency of losses (Collins and al, 1997 and Soussi and al, 2006), earnings 
can be considered as having been subject for earnings management and smoothing of earnings. Amir and 
Lev (1996) find a negative association between book value of equity and market value and a positive 
association between earnings and market value (in the model of market value of the firm as dependant 
variable and earnings and book value of equity as independent variables). Thus, when earnings and book 
value of equity are relevant in the same model, they have opposite signs. The negative association 
between the size of the firm and market value can be explained by the political costs. The addition of 
variables of disclosure to the accounting model makes the accounting numbers relevant to investors for 
low-tech firms. Thus, voluntary disclosure for these firms explains the irrelevance of accounting numbers. 
The significance of the change in R2 between the models is tested using the test of addition of variables. 
We use Chow test to study the difference of  value relevance levels between subsamples.  The level of 
relevance of the accounting model and of accounting model with control variables and sub-indexes of 
disclosure is low for low-tech firms and high-tech firms. The level of relevance of these models is high for 
medium-tech firms (these firms have an average technological level). The introduction of variables 
representing voluntary disclosure decreases significantly the relevance of accounting model for low-tech 
firms. For the high technology firms, the introduction of disclosure’s variables increases insignificantly 
the relevance of the accounting model. Voluntary disclosure explains to a certain level low relevance of 
accounting information for these firms. Furthermore, the relevance of accounting model is higher for low 
technology firms than for high technology firms (the high technology firms have higher level of 
disclosure). 
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Table 3: Results of multiple regressions (suite) 
Model Basic model with introduction of 
control  variables and D4 
Basic model with introduction of 
control  variables and D5 
Basic model with introduction of 
control  variables and D6 
Basic model with introduction of 
control  variables and D7 
     group 
variable 
Total 
sample 
LT MT HT Total 
sample 
LT MT HT Total 
sample 
LT MT HT Total 
sample 
LT MT HT 
BVi,t/Pi,t-1    0.828 
(42.71)*** 
-0.328 
(-1.19) 
 0.815 
(36.58)*** 
 -0.310 
(-0.47) 
0.821 
(42.96)*** 
0.675 
(2.23)** 
0.808    
(38.90)***   
-0.469 
(-0.72) 
0.826 
(43.11)*** 
0.622 
(1.71) 
0.815 
(38.04)*** 
0.202 
(0.33) 
0.826 
(43.09)*** 
-0.352 
(-1.72) 
0.812 
(37.87)*** 
-0.012 
(-0.02) 
Ei,t/Pi,t-1    -2.518 
(-9.99)*** 
-
17.948 
(-
3.46)** 
-2.719 
(-9.12)***   
7.687 
(2.92)*** 
-2.646 
(-
10.59)*** 
5.316 
(1.30) 
-2.853 
 (-
10.36)***  
6.177 
(2.83)*** 
-2.554 
(-
10.34)*** 
4.059 
(0.68) 
-2.746 
(-9.85)*** 
 5.747 
(2.66)** 
-2.554 
(-
10.34)*** 
-17.447 
(-4.57)** 
-2.765 
(-9.89)*** 
6.322 
(2.86)***  
D4 -0.487 
(-0.63)    
2.657 
(2.06)    
-0.323 
(-0.28)   
0.719 
(0.35)    
            
D5     1.269 
(1.65)    
0.979 
(0.34)    
2.876 
(1.86)*   
1.203 
(0.63)    
        
D6         0.237 
(0.34)   
-1.025 
(-0.28)   
1.367 
(0.81)    
-1.899 
(-1.26)   
    
D7             -0.269 
(-0.25)    
8.605 
(3.20)**   
1.587 
(0.83)   
-1.032 
(-0.51)    
Log TA -0.310 
(-4.73)***    
0.057 
(0.08)    
-0.299 
(-2.44)**   
-0.429 
(-2.18)**   
-0.325 
(-5.06)*** 
-0.837 
(-0.91) 
-0.294 
(-2.50)** 
-0.247 
(-1.41)  
-0.285 
(-3.78 )*** 
-0.453 
(-1.00 ) 
-0.255 
(-1.89 )*  
-0.261 
(-1.54 )   
-0.299 
(-4.73 )*** 
0.047 
(0.09 ) 
-0.353 
(-2.60 )** 
-0.243 
(-1.38 ) 
Lev 0.326 
(1.25)    
2.056 
(2.87)*    
0.437 
(1.31)    
-0.653 
(-0.43)   
0.195 
(0.74 ) 
0.133 
(0.14) 
0.302 
(0.95 )  
-0.677 
(-0.48 ) 
0.287 
(1.08 ) 
-0.108 
(-0.14 ) 
0.228 
(0.57 ) 
-0.074 
(-0.07)  
0.320 
(1.20 ) 
1.741 
(3.79 )** 
0.299 
(0.85) 
0.088 
(0.07 ) 
FP 0.326 
(5.28)***    
28.877 
(4.80) 
**   
0.320 
(4.58)***   
-1.406 
(-2.26)**     
0.330 
(5.41)*** 
-0.606 
(-0.24 ) 
0.326 
(4.87)***  
  -0.904 
(-1.78)*  
0.324 
(5.22 )*** 
1.077 
(0.18 ) 
0.313 
(4.48 )*** 
-0.905 
(-1.83 )* 
0.326 
(5.26 )*** 
28.555    
(6.41 )*** 
0.324 
(4.68 )*** 
-0.965 
(-1.84 )* 
GR 4.19E-09    
(2.22)**   
5.11E-
09    
(1.03)    
5.08E-09    
(2.10)**   
1.27E-07   
(0.81)   
4.69E-09    
(2.49 )** 
4.14E-09    
(0.76 ) 
5.15E-09    
(2.24 )**  
9.13E-08    
(0.58 )  
4.18E-09    
(2.21 )** 
2.19E-09    
(0.39 ) 
5.14E-09    
(2.16 )** 
 1.01E-07    
(0.65  ) 
4.18E-09    
(2.21 )** 
-6.23E-09    
(-2.24 )  
5.73E-09    
(2.31 )** 
 7.54E-
08    
(0.48) 
Test of 
homogeneity 
of 
constants 
F= 1.08                
P= 0.4110 
> 5% 
F= 
12.20                
P=  
0.0317 
< 5% 
F= 2.03               
P= 0.0787 
> 5% 
F=    4.98                                                        
P= 
0.0280 
< 5% 
F= 1.00
  P= 
0.5058 
> 5% 
F= 5.01
P= 
0.1056  
> 5% 
F= 1.96              
P= 0.0889 
> 5% 
F=   1.58                             
P=  
0.2987 
> 5% 
F= 1.05    
P= 0.4454 
> 5% 
F= 5.49 
P= 0.0940 
> 5% 
F= 1.90               
P= 0.0995 
> 5% 
F=  1.26                             
P= 0.4130 
> 5% 
F= 1.05       
 P= 0.4480 
> 5% 
F= 19.10   
P= 0.0167   
< 5% 
F= 1.89               
P= 
0.1012 
>5% 
F= 2.05                            
P= 
0.1915 
> 5% 
Hausman 
Test 
 χ2=  
19.91 
P= 
0.0029 
< 0.05 
 χ 2=  
3.46 
P= 
0.7494 
> 0.05 
    
 
     χ 2=  53.15 
P= 0.0000 
< 0.05 
  
Estimation 
method 
retained 
OLS FE OLS RE OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS FE OLS OLS 
R²  
and number 
of 
observations 
R²=0.9948 
F=2482.42 
P= 0.0000 
n= 99 
R²= 
0.0009                                         
F= 
16.36 
P= 
0.0213 
n= 21 
R²=0.9973 
F=2063.87 
P= 0.0000 
n= 47 
R²= 
.3551                                         
Wald 
chi2(7) 
=17.23 
P= 
0.0160 
n= 31 
R²=0.9949 
F=2545.85
P= 0.0000 
n= 99 
R²=0.462 
F= 1.60 
P= 
0.2209 
n= 21 
R²=0.9975 
F=2242.53 
P= 0.0000 
n= 47 
R²0.3955 
F=   2.15 
P= 
0.0785 
n= 31 
R²=0.9948 
F=2474.81 
P= 0.0000 
n= 99 
R²=0.4610 
F = 1.59 
P= 0.2236 
n= 21 
R²=0.9973 
F=2094.16 
P= 0.0000 
n= 47 
R²=0.4250 
F=  2.43 
P= 0.0510 
n= 31 
R²=0.9948 
F=2473.24 
P= 0.0000 
n= 99 
 
R²=0.0133                                         
F=  30.18 
P=  0.0088 
n= 21 
R²=
0.9973 
F= 
2096.36 
P = 
0.0000 
n = 47 
R²=   
0.3920 
F= 2.12 
P= 
0.0825 
n= 31 
 
B- Voluntary Disclosure  On  Intangibles And  Low Relevance Of Accounting Information 
 
1. Literature Review 
 
There is a complementary relationship between traditional accounting information and non-financial 
information representing intangible expenses for high-tech firms (Amir and Lev, 1996). Lev and Zarowin 
(1999) show that the decline of the relevance of accounting earnings is due to the importance of 
intangibles none capitalized. Our goal in this second part is to investigate whether the voluntary 
disclosure on intangibles explains the low relevance of accounting information. Goodwin (2002) shows 
that relevance of earnings is decreasing for firms that do not recognize intangible assets and there is little 
evidence of decline for firms which recognize intangible assets. In addition, after controlling losses, 
capitalizers did not have a change in the relevance of earnings and non capitalizers have a decrease of 
earnings’ relevance. Goodwin and Ahmed (2006) show that the difference of earnings’ relevance between 
"capitalizers" firms and "non-capitalizers" firms is more important in the latter part of the 1990s and that 
this difference is increasing. Furthermore, Lopes (2003) find  that accounting numbers are more relevant 
for high-tech firms than for traditional firms in Brazil where there is capitalization of intangibles. 
Moreover, Ahmed and Falk (2006) demonstrate that managerial discretion in accounting practice, to 
capitalize or to expense R & D, offers a higher relevance than accounting numbers that are the product of 
mandatory expensing of R & D. Of same, Wang (2000) shows that firms choose the accounting method to 
apply for software R & D that is more informative about their values. Unlike the pre-cited researches, 
Oswald (2008) shows that « Expensers » firms have little gain or nothing to gain in terms of relevance 
when they adjust their earnings and book values of equity to reflect the numbers as if these firms were 
"capitalizers". Similarly, Cheng, Hsieh and Yip (2007) show that the accounting choice has no significant 
144 
 
effect on the relevance of accounting information. Amir and Lev (1996) conclude that the disclosure on 
intangibles decreases the relevance of accounting information. Also, Lee, Press and Choi (2005) attribute 
the low relevance of earnings for high-tech firms relative to low-tech firms mainly to noise (non financial 
information). By studying Brazilian market, Lopes (2003) show that accounting numbers are more 
relevant for high-tech firms than for traditional firms. Lopes (2003) advance among the arguments of his 
results that in the emerging market studied, information sources for high tech firms are less available 
than in developed markets. Furthermore, Zhao (2002) shows that the level of disclosure on research and 
development has a significant effect on the relevance of accounting information.  
 
2. Methodology 
 
According to our literature review,  we  test the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 3: The recognized intangibles are more relevant than disclosed intangibles. 
Hypothesis 4: The level of disclosure on intangibles has an effect on the relevance of the accounting 
model for evaluating companies. 
Hypothesis 5: The intensity of intangible expenditures (intangibles recognized in the income statement) 
has an effect on the relevance of the accounting model for evaluating companies. 
Hypothesis 6: The weight of intangible assets (intangibles recognized on the balance sheet) has an effect 
on the relevance of the accounting model for evaluating companies 
 
Sample and Data Collection: We study the same sample of Canadian companies of the first part. 
 
Specification of models: We  study the basic accounting model used in the first part and we introduce 
variables representing the intangibles : 
 
Variable: Intensity of intangible expenses : The ratio of intensity of intangible expenses that we use is 
calculated as: The intensity of intangible expenses = [expenditures on research and development + 
training costs + the spending on advertising, promotion and marketing expenses + management and 
organizational expenditures + expenditures for production process + software expenses + royalties paid 
(fees for concessions, patents, licenses, trademarks, processes, franchises, copyrights and reproduction; 
other similar rights and assets) + the spending assigned to quality standards + start-up and pre-operating 
costs + Other types of intangible expenses] / sales. Lev and Sougiannis (1996) use the indicators of 
intangible expenses intensity : annual R & D / annual sales and annual expenses of advertising / annual 
sales.  
 
Variable: Intangible assets: Intangible assets are those recognized in the balance sheet. We use the 
variable weight of intangible assets (Cazavan-Jeny, 2004). 
 
Variable: Level of disclosure on intangibles: We use the index of disclosure on intangibles used in 
Trabelsi and Labelle (2006) (Appendix 4). 
Multiple regressions: We estimate models that are detailed in the following. 
 
Model 1 : Basic Model 
Pi,t       = α0+  α1    Ei,t    + α2    BVi,t  +  εi,t (1)  
Pi,t-1                                      Pi,t-1                 Pi,t-1 
εi, t=residue. 
i: icompany. 
t: year (t= 1for 2006, t= 2for 2007). 
P=Share price of the company three months after the end of the fiscal year. 
BV=book value of equity of the company at the end of the fiscal year divided by the number of shares. 
E=net income per share before extraordinary items of the company 
 
Model 2: Basic model with the introduction of control variables and intensity of intangible 
expenses (intangibles recognized in the income statement) 
Pi,t = a0 + a1 Ei,t + a2  BVi,t + a 3 IIi,t + a 4 Log TAi,t + a5 GRi,t + a 6 FPi,t + a 7 Lev i,t + εi,t .    
Pi,t-1                       Pi,t-1             Pi,t-1                                                                                                     
II = intensity of intangible expenditures = intangible expenditures / sales. 
Log TA = Log of total assets (log base 10). 
GR = growth rate = change in sales from t to t-1. 
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FP = financial profitability or return = net income / equity. 
Lev = Leverage = long-term debt / equity. 
 
Model 3: Basic model with the introduction of control variables and the weight of intangible assets 
(intangibles recognized on the balance sheet) 
Pi,t  =b0 +  b1  Ei,t   +b2   BVi,t  + b 3 IAi,t+ b 4 LogTAi,t+b5GRi,t+b 6FPi,t+b 7Lev i,t+εi,t .    
Pi,t-1                           Pi,t-1              Pi,t-1                                                                                                     
IA= intangible assets = weight of intangible assets=intangible assets/ total assets. 
 
Model 4: Basic model with the introduction of control variables and the index of disclosure on 
intangibles 
Pi,t  = b0 +  b1  Ei,t   + b2 BVi,t  + b 3D6i,t+ b 4LogTAi,t+ b5GRi,t+ b 6FPi,t+ b 7Lev i,t+ εi,t .    
Pi,t-1                            Pi,t-1              Pi,t-1                                                                                                     
D6i, t=index of disclosure on intangibles. 
 
3. Results and discussions of the second part 
 
Table 4: Results of multiple regressions 
Model Basic model with the introduction of control variables 
and  D6 
Group 
variable                                                                           
Total 
sample
Low 
technology 
Medium  
technology 
High  
technology 
BVi,t/Pi,t-1    0.826 
(43.11)*** 
0.622 
(1.71) 
0.815 
(38.04)*** 
0.202 
(0.33) 
Ei,t/Pi,t-1    -2.554 
(-10.34)*** 
4.059 
(0.68) 
-2.746 
(-9.85)*** 
 5.747 
(2.66)** 
D6 0.237 
(0.34)   
-1.025 
(-0.28)   
1.367 
(0.81)    
-1.899 
(-1.26)   
Log TA -0.285 
(-3.78 )*** 
-0.453 
(-1.00 ) 
-0.255 
(-1.89 )*  
-0.261 
(-1.54 )   
Lev 0.287 
(1.08 ) 
-0.108 
(-0.14 ) 
 0.228 
(0.57 ) 
-0.074 
(-0.07)  
FP 0.324 
(5.22 )*** 
1.077 
(0.18 ) 
0.313 
(4.48 )*** 
-0.905 
(-1.83 )* 
GR 4.18E-09    
(2.21 )** 
2.19E-09    
(0.39 ) 
5.14E-09    
(2.16 )** 
 1.01E-07    
(0.65  ) 
R²  
and number of observations 
R²= 0.9948 
F=  2474.81 
P= 0.0000 
n= 99 
R²= 0.4610 
F = 1.59 
P= 0.2236 
n= 21 
R²= 0.9973 
F= 2094.16 
P= 0.0000 
n= 47 
R²= 0.4250 
F=  2.43 
P= 0.0510 
n= 31 
 
Legend of tables 4 and 5: 
FT: low-technology sectors, MT: medium-technology sectors, HT: high-tech sectors. 
Pi, t = Share price of the company three months after the end of the fiscal year. 
BV = book value of equity of the company at the end of the fiscal year divided by the number of shares. 
E = net income before extraordinary items per share of the company. 
IA = intangible assets= weight of intangible assets = intangible assets / total assets. 
II = intensity of intangible expenditures= intangible expenditures / sales. 
D6=  index of disclosure on intangibles 
Log TA = Log of total assets (log base 10). 
GR = growth rate = change in sales from t to t-1. 
FP = financial profitability or return = net income / equity. 
Lev = Leverage = long-term debt / equity. 
F = value of the Fisher statistic. 
P: probability of F (or χ 2) greater than the calculated critical value of F (χ 2) or significance of F (or χ 2). 
OLS: ordinary least squares. 
R ²: model's explanatory power. 
n: number of observations. 
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Values in parentheses are the values of t-statistics., * Significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** 
significant at 1% 
D6: Index of disclosure on intangibles. 
 
Table 5: Summary of multiple regressions (suite) 
Model                 Basic model Basic model with introduction of control 
variables  
Basic model with introduction of 
control variables and intangible 
expenses intensity  
Basic model with  introduction of 
control variables and weight of 
intangible assets 
Group 
variable 
Total 
sample 
LT MT HT Total 
sample 
LT MT HT Total 
sample 
LT MT HT Total 
sample 
LT MT HT 
BVi,t/Pi,t-1    0.883 
(45.38)*** 
0.498 
(1.72) 
0.873 
(39.37)*** 
-0.205    
(-0.39) 
0.826 
(43.32)*** 
 0.814 
(38.35)***   
-0.229 
(-0.44) 
0.947 
(8.18)*** 
1.182 
(1.29) 
0.668 
(5.54)*** 
-0.411 
(-0.75) 
0.828 
(44.00)*** 
0.098 
(0.22) 
0.815 
(39.61)*** 
-0.227 
(-0.43) 
Ei,t/Pi,t-1    -1.725 
(-7.09)*** 
1.549 
(0.99) 
-1.904 
(-6.78)***   
3.201 
(3.14)*** 
-2.551 
(-
10.39)*** 
 -2.747 
(-9.90)***  
6.191 
(2.87)*** 
-0.857 
(-0.54) 
-2.731 
(-0.23) 
-4.773 
(-
2.89)*** 
10.071 
(2.68)** 
-2.519 
(-
10.38)*** 
6.589 
(1.75) 
-2.703 
(-
10.01)*** 
6.991 
(2.94) 
*** 
II         0.699 
(2.11)** 
25.846 
(0.87)  
2.822 
(0.81)  
-0.252      
(-1.26) 
    
IA             -0.741 
(-1.94)* 
1.705 
(1.72) 
-1.333 
(-1.90)* 
1.040 
(0.82) 
Log TA     -0.299 
(-4.76)*** 
 -0.303 
(-2.50)** 
-0.224 
(-1.32 )  
-1.403 
(-4.43 
)*** 
0.0775 
(0.09 ) 
-0.389 
(-2.18)**  
-0.276 
(-1.58 )   
-0.304 
(-4.91)*** 
-0.157 
(-0.42 
) 
-0.345 
(-2.89)*** 
-0.183 
(-1.03  
) 
Lev     0.306 
(1.18   ) 
 0.417 
(1.30 )  
-0.179 
(-0.16 ) 
1.683 
(1.37 ) 
0.312 
(0.33) 
0.135 
(0.44 ) 
-0.428 
(-0.36 )  
0.289 
(1.13 ) 
0.248 
(0.36 ) 
0.564 
(1.76 )* 
0.343 
(0.26 ) 
FP     0.325 
(5.29 )*** 
 0.321 
(4.66 )***  
-0.902 
(-1.80 )*  
2.768 
(1.98 )* 
6.879 
(0.69 ) 
2.108 
(1.69 ) 
-2.662 
(-1.77 
)* 
0.334 
(5.49 )*** 
0.926 
(0.38 ) 
0.335 
(4.99 )*** 
-1.014    
(-1.94  
)* 
GR     4.17E-09    
(2.22 )** 
 5.16E-09    
(2.17 )**  
7.51E-08    
(0.49 )  
1.14E-09    
(0.47 ) 
4.56E-
09    
(0.86) 
3.12E-09    
(1.32 ) 
-1.14E-
08    
(-0.07) 
3.54E-09    
(1.88 )* 
3.59E-
09    
(0.87 )  
4.54E-09    
(1.95)* 
1.84E-
07    
(0.90) 
Test of 
homo- 
geneity 
of 
cons-tants 
F= 1.45               
P= 0.1053 
> 5% 
F= 
1.42                
P= 
0.315> 
5% 
F= 1.44               
P= 0.2047 
> 5% 
F=   0.95               
P=  
0.5514 
>5% 
F=  1.07               
P=  
0.4147 
> 5% 
F=
6.50                
P= 
0.043 
< 5% 
F= 2.06              
P= 0.0693 
> 5% 
F= 1.57                
P= 
0.2791 
> 5% 
F= 1.84               
P=  
0.0399 
< 5% 
F= 
40.62                 
P= 
0.120> 
5% 
F= 2.13               
P=   
0.1111 
> 5% 
F=  1.19                
P= 
0.461> 
5% 
F= 0.98              
P=0.5299 
> 5% 
F=
6.15                
P=  
0.080> 
5% 
F= 2.07               
P=  
0.0731 
>5% 
F= 
2.18                
 P=  
0.170 
>5% 
 
Hausm-an 
test 
      
CHI2= 
-38.98    
CHI2<0 
   
χ 2= 
21.87 
P=0.0013 
<0.05 
 
       
Estimation 
method 
retained 
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS  OLS OLS FE OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
 
R²  
and num-
ber of 
observations 
 
R²= 
0.9920 
F= 
5981.36 
P= 0.0000 
n= 99 
 
R²= 
0.174 
F= 
1.90 
P= 
0.178 
n= 21 
 
R²= 
0.9954 
F= 
4785.29 
P= 0.0000 
n= 47 
 
R² =  
0.2609 
F=  4.94 
P= 
0.0145 
n= 31 
 
R²= 
0.9948 
F= 
2915.21 
P= 0.0000 
n= 99 
  
R²= 
0.9973 
F= 
2464.68 
P= 0.0000 
n= 47 
 
R² = 
0.3852 
F=     
2.51 
P= 
0.0502 
n= 31 
 
R²= 
0.9711                                         
F= 
2485.85 
P= 
0.0000 
n= 83 
 
R²= 
0.510
F = 
1.34 
P= 
0.3332 
n= 17 
 
R²= 
0.9986 
F= 2948 
P= 
0.0000 
n= 36 
 
R²= 
0.4297 
F=  2.37 
P= 
0.0577 
n= 30 
 
R²= 
0.9950 
F= 
2573.96 
P= 0.0000 
n= 99 
 
 
R²= 
0.5579 
F=  
2.34 
P=  
0.0877 
n= 21 
 
R²= 
0.9975 
F= 
2250.52 
P = 
0.0000 
n =47 
 
R²=    
0.402 
F=  
2.22 
P= 
0.0709 
n= 31 
 
We find a negative association and significant only at 10% between  the weights of intangible assets and 
stock market prices (as in Ely and Waymire, 1999). This relation shows that the capitalization of 
intangible issues a negative signal to investors. The intangibles recognized are more relevant than 
intangibles disclosed only for the total sample and medium-tech firms. The level of relevance of the 
accounting model with control variables and recognized and disclosed intangibles is low for low 
technology firms and high technology firms. The level of relevance of these three models is high for 
medium-tech firms. For the model 3 in the table 6, there is no difference of R2 for the three subsamples. 
However, there is a difference between the R2 for the three sub-samples for the model 4 in table 5 and the 
model in table   5. The R2 of low-tech firms is higher than the R2 of high technology firms for the three 
models above (high tech firms have higher level of relevance). The introduction of intangibles recognized 
and disclosed in the accounting model increases not significantly the relevance of this model with one 
exception for the total sample. The intensity of intangible expenditures has a significant effect on the 
relevance of the accounting model for the total sample. 
 
5. General Conclusion 
 
For the basic model, we find a low level of relevance for high technology firms and low technology firms. 
Medium-tech firms have a high level of relevance (due to average technological level). The introduction of 
the overall disclosure index and sub-indexes of disclosure decreases significantly the relevance of the 
accounting model for low- tech firms. For high technology firms, it increases insignificantly the relevance 
of the accounting model. Thus, voluntary disclosure explains to a certain level the low relevance of 
accounting information. The relevance of accounting model is higher for low tech firms than for high tech 
firms (high tech firms have higher level of disclosure). Furthermore, the addition of variables of 
disclosure to the accounting model makes the accounting numbers relevant to investors for low-tech 
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firms. Thus, voluntary disclosure for these firms explains the irrelevance of accounting numbers. For 
medium-tech firms, book value and earnings are relevant. For high technology firms, the earnings are 
relevant but the book value of equity is not relevant due to the capitalization of intangibles. This 
capitalization could be used as a signal and as a means of earnings management. In the second part of our 
research, we show that the inclusion of intangibles recognized and disclosed increases none significantly 
the relevance of the accounting model. Medium-tech firms have a high level of relevance of the accounting 
model, while the level of relevance of low-tech firms and high - tech firms is low. Dontoh et al (2004) and 
Lim and al (2011) show that the increased noise in stock returns over time is the primary factor of the 
decrease in the relevance of earnings. We could consider that the application of IFRS could result in 
higher levels of relevance of accounting information. However, Narktabtee et al (2011) and Barth et al 
(2008) show that it is not the application of IFRS that provides higher quality of accounting information 
and that  improving the quality of accounting information depends both on the characteristics of the firm 
and the country.  
 
Recommendations: Other factors have an impact on the relevance of accounting information. For 
example, Cottle et al. (1998) argue that the increasing use of the balance sheet by investors is explained 
by the change in ownership structure. On the other hand, conservatism can be seen as another factor 
explaining the low relevance of accounting information. However, Balachandran and Mohanram, (2011) 
find that firms with a growing level of conservatism do not have more declining relevance of accounting 
information. Researches could study more these factors explaining low level of relevance. 
 
References 
 
Aboody, D. & Lev, B. (1998). The value relevance of intangibles: The case of software capitalization. 
Journal of Accounting Research, Supplement 1998, 161-191.  
Ahmed, K. & Falk, H. (2006). The value relevance of management's research and development reporting 
choice: Evidence from Australia. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 25(3), 231. 
Allen, S. (2003). Understanding book value for investors. Canadian stock picks and stock research, 
investorsfriends.com.   
Al-Shammari, B. & Al-Sultan, W. (2010).Corporate governance and voluntary disclosure in Kuwait. 
International Journal of Disclosure and Governance, 7(3), 262–280. 
Amir, E. & Lev, B. (1996). Value-relevance of non financial information: the wireless communications 
industry. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 22, 3–30. 
Balachandran, S. & Mohanram, P. (2011). Is the decline in the value relevance of accounting driven by 
increased conservatism? Review of Accounting Studies, 16(2), 272. 
Banghøj, J. &Plenborg, T. (2008). Value relevance of voluntary disclosure in the annual report. Accounting 
and Finance, 48(2), 159. 
Barth, M. E., Beaver, W. H. & Landsman, W. R. (1998). Relative valuation roles of equity book value and net   
                income as a function of financial health. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 25, 1-34. 
Barth, M. E., Landsman, W. R. & Lang, M. H. (2008). International Accounting  Standards and Accounting 
Quality. Journal of Accounting Research, 46(3), 467. 
Beattie, V., Goodagre, A. &Thomson, S. (2000). Recognition versus disclosure: An investigation of the 
impact on equity risk using UK operating lease disclosures. Journal of Business, Finance and 
Auditing, 27(9) and (10). 
Bernard, V. & Schipper, K. (1994). Recognition and disclosure in financial reporting. working paper, 
University of Michigan and University of Chicago. 
Botosan, C. A. (1997). Disclosure level and the cost of equity capital. The Accounting Review, 72(3), 323–
350. 
Brown, S., Lo, K. & Lys, T. (1999). Use of R2 in accounting research: measuring changes in value relevance 
over the last four decades. working paper, Northwestern University. 
Callimaci, A. & Landry, S. (2004). Market valuation of Research and Development Spending under 
Canadian GAAP. Canadian Accounting Perspectives, 3(1), 33. 
Cazavan-Jeny, A. (2004). Le ratio market-to-book et la reconnaissance des immatériels- une étude du 
marché français. Comptabilité-Contrôle-Audit, 10 (2), 99-124. 
Chalmers, K., Clinch, G. & Godfrey, J. M. (2011). Changes in value relevance of accounting information 
upon IFRS adoption: Evidence from Australia. Australian Journal of Management, 36(2), 151–173. 
Chang, J. (1999). The decline in value relevance of earnings and book values. working paper, University of 
Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, January 1999. 
148 
 
Cheng, C. S. A., Hsieh, S. J. & Yip, Y. (2007). Impact of accounting choices on firm valuation and earnings               
Quality The case of transition obligation under SFAS 106. Review of Accounting and Finance, 6(4),               
419-441. 
Christie, A. (1987). On cross-sectional analysis in accounting research. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, 9, 231-258. 
Collins, D., Maydew, E. & Weiss, I. (1997).Changes in the value-relevance of earnings and book values over 
the past forty years. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 24(1), 39–68. 
 Cottle, S., Murray, R. & Block, F.  (1998). Graham and Dodd’s security analysis. 5th ed, New York: McGra-
Hill.  
Ding, Y., Entwistle, G. & Stolowy, H. (2004). International differences in research and development 
reporting practices: a French and Canadian comparison. Advances in International Accounting, 17, 
55-72. 
Dontoh, A., Radhakrishnan, S. & Ronen, J. (2004). The Declining Value-relevance of Accounting 
Information and Non-information-based Trading: An Empirical Analysis. Contemporary 
Accounting Research, 21(4), 795-18. 
Ely, K. & Waymire, G. (1999). Intangible assets and stock prices in the Pre-SEC Era. Journal of Accounting 
Research, 37, 17-51.  
Gelb, D. S. & Zarowin, P. (2002). Corporate Disclosure Policy and the Informativeness of Stock Prices. 
Review of Accounting Studies, 7, 33–52. 
Goodwin, J. (2002). Longitudinal Earnings Value Relevance and Intangible Assets: Evidence from 
Australian Firms, 1975-99. March 2002, working paper, Trobe University, School of Business, 
www.ssrn.com. 
Goodwin, J. & Ahmed, K. (2006).Longitudinal value relevance of earnings and intangible assets: Evidence 
from Australian firms. Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, 15, 72–91. 
Healy, P., Hutton, A. & Palepu, K. (1999a). Stock performance and intermediation changes surrounding 
sustained increases in disclosure. Contemporary Accounting Research, 16(2). 
Healy, P., Myers, S. & Howe, C. (1999b). R&D accounting and the tradeoff between relevance and 
objectivity. working paper, Harvard Business School. 
Holthausen, R. W. & Watts, R. L. (2001). The relevance of the value-relevance literature for financial 
accounting standard setting.  Journal of Accounting and Economics, 31, 3-75.  
Lapointe-Antunes, P., Cormier, D., Magnan, M. & Gay-Angers, S. (2006). On the Relationship between 
Voluntary Disclosure, Earnings Smoothing and the Value-Relevance of Earnings: The Case of 
Switzerland. European Accounting Review, 15(4), 465. 
Lee, B. B., Press, E. & Choi, B. B. (2005).Why is the Value Relevance of Earnings Lower for High-Tech 
Firms? January 2005, working paper, www.ssrn.com. 
Lev, B. (1989). On the usefulness of earnings and earnings research: Lessons and directions from two 
decades of empirical research, Journal of Accounting Research, Supplement 1989, 153-192.  
Lev, B. & Sougiannis T. (1996). The capitalization, amortization and value relevance of Research and 
Development. Journal of Accounting and Economics, February 1996, 107-138.  
Lev, B. & Zarowin, P. (1999). The boundaries of financial reporting and how to extend them. Journal of 
Accounting Research, 37 (2), 353-385.  
Lo, K. (2004). The effect of scale differences on inferences in accounting research coefficient estimates, 
tests of incremental association and relative value relevance. Working paper, September 2004. 
Lopes, A. B. (2003).The Value Relevance of Brazilian Accounting Numbers: An Empirical Investigation. 
Working paper, University of Sao Paulo, May 2003. 
Lang, M. & Lundholm, R. (1993). Cross-sectional determinants of analysts’ ratings of corporate 
disclosures. Journal of Accounting Research, 31, 246–271. 
Lim, S. C. & Park, T. (2011). The declining association between earnings and  returns; Diminishing value 
relevance of earnings or noisier markets? Management Research Review, 34(8), 947. 
Lundholm, R. & Myers, L. A. (2002).Bringing the future forward: The effect of disclosure on the returns 
earnings relation. Journal of Accounting Research, 40, 809-839. 
Luo, S., Courtenay, S. M. & Hossain, M. (2006).The effect of voluntary disclosure, ownership structure and 
proprietary cost on the return–future earnings relation. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 14, 501–
521. 
Narktabtee, K. & Patpanichchot, S. (2011).The impact of country – level versus firm – level factors on the 
effectiveness of IFRS adoption: The case of European Union. International Business and Economics 
Research Journal, 10(10). 
Ohlson, J. A. (1995). Earnings, book value, and dividends in equity valuation. Contemporary accounting 
research, 11, 661-687. 
149 
 
Oswald, D. R. (2008). The Determinants and Value Relevance of the Choice of Accounting for Research and 
Development Expenditures in the United Kingdom. JOURNAL, 35(1/2), 1. 
Ramesh, K. & Thiagarajan, R. (1995). Inter-temporal Decline in Earnings Response Coefficients. Working 
Paper, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL. 
Soussi, J. C., Matoussi, H. & Mouelhi, R. (2006). Intangibles and low relevance of accounting information. 
Master thesis in accounting, ISCAE of Tunis, may 2006. 
Trabelsi, S. & Labelle, R. (2006). Evidence that Corporate Websites is a Part of the Firm’s Overall 
Disclosure Package. May 2006, working paper, www.google.com. 
Wang, W. (2000).Discretionary choices of accounting methods and value relevance: R&D accounting in 
the software industry. Ph.D. Dissertation, Washington University, 57 pages, 
http://proquest.umi.com. 
Zhao, R. (2002). Relative value relevance of research and development reporting: An international 
comparison. Journal of International Financial Management and Accounting, 13(2), 153-174. 
 
Appendix 1: Present the Disclosure index used in Trabelsi and Labelle (2006) 
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Appendix 2:Grouping of industries by level of knowledge (Canadian classification) 
High level Medium level Low level 
Scientific and professional equipment 
(M) 
Communications equipment and 
other electronic equipment (M) 
aerospace (M) 
Computer and related services (S) 
Office machines (M) 
Engineering and scientific services (S) 
pharmaceuticals (M) 
electrical energy (S) 
Other chemicals (M) 
machinery (M) 
Refined petroleum and coal (M) 
Management Consulting Services (S) 
 
educational services (S) 
Health and Social Services (S) 
Pipeline Transportation (S) 
Other business services (S) 
 
Other transport equipment (M) 
 
Other electrical and electronic 
products (M) 
Primary metals, nonferrous (M) 
textiles (M) 
communications (S) 
Paper and allied products (M) 
Mines (P) 
rubber (M) 
Plastic (M) 
Primary metals, ferrous (M) 
Non-metallic mineral (M) 
Wholesale trade (S) 
 
Crude oil and natural gas (P) 
metal products (M) 
Automobiles and parts (M) 
foodstuffs (M) 
drinks (M) 
tobacco (M) 
Finance, insurance, real estate (S) 
Other utilities (S) 
Printing and publishing (M) 
Construction (S) 
Amusement and leisure(S) 
Fishing and trapping (P) 
 
Other manufactured products 
(M) 
wood (M) 
Furniture and furnishing (M) 
Felling and forestry (P) 
Transport (S) 
Storage and Warehousing (S) 
Agriculture (P) 
Retail business (S) 
personal  services (S) 
Quarries and sand (P) 
Accommodation and 
restoration (S) 
clothing (M) 
leather (M) 
 
Note’s: Primary, M: Manufacturing, S: Services 
Source: Lee(1996) 1in Carroll(1998, p. 2) 24 
 
Appendix 3: Methods of classification of firms in high technology firms and traditional firms 
 
 
 
Appendix 4: Scoring Procedures (Trabelsi and Labelle, 2006) Background Information: 
 
Corporate goals: One point is awarded if the annual report includes a statement of the corporate goal or 
mission. One additional point is awarded if the goal is stated in quantitative terms, e.g. 
ROE of X %. Maximum points = 2.0 
 
                                                 
 
Research Method for classifying firms into traditional firms and 
HT firms 
Collins, Maydew and Weiss (1997) Classification according to « two-digit SIC codes » 
Barth, Beaver and Landsman (1998) Membership in high technology sectors: pharmaceutical 
industry (classification according to the SIC codes) as a 
proxy for high-tech sectors. 
Francis and Schipper (1999)  Classification depending on whether the sectors expected 
to have significant unrecognized intangibles, to verify the 
classification obtained, they compared the R & D 
expenditures as a percentage of total assets and ratio of 
market-to-book of the two subsamples 
Choi, Lee and  Press (2002) Classification according to the ratio market-to-book: the 
high-tech companies are those with the four highest 
deciles of the ratio market-to-book and traditional 
businesses have the lowest four deciles of the ratio. 
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Statement of business strategy: One point is awarded if the annual report includes a general statement 
of corporate strategy. One point is awarded if specific actions taken during the current year are outlined 
and one additional point is given if this includes quantitative information. One point is given if the annual 
report outlines specific actions to be taken in future years and one additional point is given if this includes 
quantitative information. One point is awarded if the annual report gives a time frame for attaining the 
corporate goal. Maximum points = 6.0 
 
Competition: One point is awarded if the annual report discusses barriers to entry. One point is awarded 
if the report discusses the impact of these on current firm profits and an additional point is given if the 
impact is quantified. One point is awarded if the annual report discusses the impact of barriers to entry 
on future firm profits and an additional point is given if this impact is quantified. One point is awarded if 
the report discusses the intensity of competition. One point is awarded if the impact of this on current 
firm profits is discussed and an additional point is given if this impact is quantified. One point is awarded 
if the report discusses the impact of competition on future firm profits and one additional point is given if 
this impact is quantified. Maximum points = 10.0 
 
Description of the business: One point is awarded if the annual report gives a general description of the 
companies’ business activities. Maximum points = 1.0 
 
Principal products: One point is awarded if the annual report lists the principal products produced. One 
point is awarded if the characteristics of these products are described and an additional point is given if 
the description includes specific, quantified information. e.g. Our machine can produce widgets 5 times 
faster than the competitors’ similar machines. Maximum points = 3.0. 
 
Principal markets: One point is awarded if the report lists the principal markets that buy the firm’s 
products. One additional point is awarded if this is quantified. e.g. % of sales to each market. One point is 
awarded if the annual report describes these markets and one additional point is given if this description 
is quantified. e.g. the size of the heavy duty truck market in 1989 was X units. Maximum points = 4.0 
 
 
Summary of historical results 
 
Annual summary: One point is awarded if sufficient information is given to compute return-on-assets for 
9 or fewer years (typically 5 or 10 years is given). One additional point is awarded if sufficient 
information is given to compute return-on-assets for 10 or more years. One point is awarded if sufficient 
information is given to compute net profit margin for 9 or fewer years and one additional point is given if 
sufficient information is available to compute net profit margin for ten or more years. One point is 
awarded if sufficient information is given to compute asset turnover for 9 or fewer years. One additional 
point is awarded if sufficient information is available to compute asset turnover for 10 or more years. 
Since any two of ROA, profit margin or asset turnover is sufficient to compute the third, companies may 
only earn point for two of the three if all three are presented. One point is awarded if sufficient 
information is available to compute return-on-equity for 9 or fewer years and one additional point is 
awarded if sufficient information is available to compute return-on-equity for 10 or more years. 
Maximum points = 6.0 
 
Quarterly summary: One point is awarded if quarterly sales and net income is available for at least the 
most recent 8 quarters. Maximum points = 1.0 
 
Key non-financial statistics: Two points are awarded for each of the 20 items listed. In some instances 
firms may provide one item more than once. For example, several market share figures may be present if 
the firm operates in more than one line of business. Only the first instance of disclosure is counted. 
Maximum points = 40.0 
 
Projected information 
 
Comparison of last year forecast to actual: One point is awarded if the annual report includes a 
comparison of a prior earnings projections to this years actual. One additional point is given if this 
comparison is quantified. One point is awarded if the annual report includes a comparison of prior sales 
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projections to these years actual. One additional point is given if this comparison is quantified. Maximum 
points = 4.0 
 
Anticipated impact of opportunities and /or risks: Two points are awarded if the report discusses the 
profit or sales implications of opportunities available to the firm. One additional point is given if these 
implications are quantified. Two points are awarded if the report discusses the profit or sales 
implications of risks facing the firm. One additional point is given if these implications are quantified. 
Maximum points = 6.0 
 
Projected market share: Two points are awarded if the annual report includes a forecast of future 
market share and one additional point is given if this is quantified. Maximum points = 3.0 
 
Projected cash flow: Two points are given if the firm provides a discussion of future cash flow 
requirements and how they will be met. One additional point is given if these requirements are 
quantified. Maximum points = 3.0 
 
Projected capital and/or research and development expenditures: Two points are given if the annual 
report includes a discussion of future capital expenditures other than those already committed to. One 
additional point is given if the amount of planned capital expenditures is given. Two points are given if 
the annual report includes a discussion of future expenditures on research and development. One 
additional point is give in the amount of planned research and development expenditures is given. 
Maximum points = 6.0 
 
Earnings and/or sales projections: For a single segment firm, two points are given if the firm provides a 
profit projection and one additional point is given if the projection is a point estimate. Two points are 
given if the firm provides a sales projection and one additional point is given if the projection is a point 
estimate. For multi-segment firms, the points awarded are weighted by the fraction of consolidated 
earnings or sales being forecast. One point multiplied by the weight as determined above is awarded for 
each segment forecast. One additional point is awarded if a consolidated forecast is made or if forecasts 
are provided for all of the firm segments and it is possible to determine the overall forecast form this 
information. If the forecasts are point estimates, one additional point times the appropriate weight is 
given. Using this procedure the maximum number of points available is 6.0 for both multi-segment and 
single segment firms. 
 
Management discussion and analysis: For a single segment firm, one point is awarded for each item 
(18 items total) discussed provided reasons for the change is given. One additional point per item is given 
if the explanation includes quantitative data. e.g. market share increased 5% over last year. Maximum 
points = 36.0For multi-segment firms, the procedure is the same except for sales and operating income. 
For these two items a firm is given only half of the points otherwise available if the report discusses the 
change in consolidated sales (or operating profit) and does not discuss the change on a segment by 
segment basis in a manner consistent with the breakdown provided in their segmented disclosure. 
 
Information on intangible assets: One point is awarded for each item (9 items) discussed. One 
additional point per item is given if the explanation includes quantitative 
 
Social and environmental information: One point is awarded for each item (7 items) discussed. One 
additional point per item is given if the explanation includes quantitative 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
